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•  While the Government plans a budget deficit of only UAH 2.4 bn, the deficit might climb to more
UAH 5.3 bn under more conservative assumptions, and in case of implementing of the reduced
17% VAT rate, the deficit might climb up to UAH 6.6 bn.
•  Macroeconomic assumptions are broadly realistic.
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1. Assumptions
1.1. Macroeconomic Assumptions
The 4.8% real GDP growth forecasted for the
budget 2004 (conservative scenario) is both real-
istic and well-balanced: it is better to be rather a
little bit conservative than over-optimistic. Ac-
cording to the forecast of the Institute for Eco-
                                                     
nomic Research and Policy Consulting, the real
GDP will grow by 5.4% next year mainly due to
positive developments in the private consumption
because of personal income tax rate reduction.
The role of investments is expected to be more
moderate due to higher political uncertainty re-
lated to the presidential elections in 2004. The
Government and the Institute forecasts on foreign
trade trends coincide in as much as both expect
higher growth rates of imports versus exports
while maintaining a positive trade balance.
1
 Originally published as Policy Paper A5, German Advisory
Group / Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consul-




Table 1: Macroeconomic Forecast for 2004: Cabinet of Ministers and IER.
Government forecast 2004 Our forecast 2004
GDP growth, % 4.8 5.4
Inflation, % 6.0 7.0
Exchange rate, UAH/USD, aop* 5.42 5.42
Import growth, % 7.0 4.7
Export growth, % 5.4 4.0
* Exchange rate is taken as average of the year
Regarding the sectoral composition of eco-
nomic growth, the budget draft is more optimistic
concerning agriculture (9%), while less optimistic
concerning industry (6%). If the present growth in
manufacturing would continue, growth figures
might be somewhat higher. A lot will depend on
the world market trends in metals, and on do-
mestic demand for products from machine build-
ing.
1.2. Tax legislation assumptions
1.  The PIT was changed into a flat-rate 13% tax
on income. Military personnel is now also
obliged to pay PIT.
2.  The rate of EPT is decreasing from 30% to
25%. Hence if everything else stay constant
the revenues would decrease by UAH 2 bn.
However, the government proposes to par-
tially compensate the decrease by the pro-
posal to come back to the old provisions of
EPT related to depreciation allowances. A
return to the old regulations implies that the
4th group of capital assets (e.g. computer
devices) will be eliminated. Privileges in the
metallurgical sector are eliminated, while
those for publishers have been introduced.
3.  The draft budget has been calculated on the
basis of the old VAT rate of 20%. In the
meanwhile, however, the Parliament has ap-
proved a new VAT rate of 17% (down from
20%).
2. Are the plans for the Consolidated
budget revenues realistic?
2.1. Revenues from reduced tax rates
In 2003, the Verkhovna Rada (VR) has approved
reductions of several important tax rates (PIT,
EPT). The draft budget nevertheless assumes
that there will be no shortfall in revenues. How-
ever, the following calculations show that the
fiscal risks connected with these simultaneous
tax cuts are tremendous. Actual tax revenues
from 2002 and estimates for 2004 will be com-
pared, with most of the figures originating from
the comment of the Government on the draft
budget.
Personal Income Tax
The personal income tax (PIT) was turned into a
flat-rate tax and reduced to a unified 13% of in-
2 come to be paid.  The lion's share of the reve-
nues from the PIT is supposed to go to regional
and local entities, and around 5% are directed to
the central budget. To offset reduced revenues
from introducing the flat rate, some tax privileges
have been abolished, as for instance those for
employees of the military. Moreover de-
shadowing effects lead to an expansion of the tax
3 base to UAH 92.4 bn.  The budget draft foresees
tax revenues of (exactly) UAH 12500 m for 2004.
The following critical issues have to be pointed
out (see also table 2):
1.  To offset the foregone revenues, the Gov-
ernment assumes that UAH 1.055 bn will be
collected additionally due to a "de-shadowing"
effect. This means that the tax income de-
clared would be increased by the tax reduc-
tion by more than eight billion UAH, or
roughly ten percent. This figure has been es-
timated as the difference of the previous ex-
ante tax estimations by the MinFin, and the
actual tax revenues made by the STA.
2.  The economic reasoning behind de-
shadowing is that the expected benefits from
hiding taxable income will become lower than
the risk to be identified and punished by the
authorities. Since taxes are only a minor part
of the total burden on salaries (there are,
more importantly, pension fund and other so-
cial contributions), employers still have a very
strong incentive to hide income. Above all,
this holds true for the lower salaries where
there will hardly be a real reduction of the tax
burden.
2
 See also IER policy paper S11 "Personal Income Tax
Reform: How to Feed the Wolf and to Keep the Sheep",
October 2002.
3
 This figure does not take into account fixed tax payments by
self-employed persons.




3. In addition to the de-shadowing revenue
mentioned above, an expansion of revenues
through an "elasticity of the tax base" of UAH
525 m is assumed. Unfortunately, the ex-
planatory text does not explain what is meant
exactly by this elasticity, and therefore makes
it hard to scrutinise the assumption.
4.  According to the budget code, the govern-
ment should plan expenditures for equalisa-
tion transfers to local budgets out of the cen-
tral budget on a formula basis. For the com-
ing year, CMU also proposes to make
amendments to the formula that implies more
transfer revenues for local entities with
greater claims for PIT social privilege. How-
ever, the amount of the transfers is calcu-
lated before the start of the budget period,
and adjustments are not made automatically.
In view of the high weight of PIT in the local
fiscal revenues, the underexecution of this
revenue source could lead to considerable
unplanned fiscal deficits and hence disturb
the fiscal stability at the local level.
Table 2: Revenues from Personal Income Tax in 2002 and 2004 (million UAH)
2002 2003 2004
actual planned Draft Budget Our estimate Shortfall
PIT:
Effective tax base 63223.3 69682.9 92450.2 86372.9
Tax rate (for 2002/03: average tax rate) 16.8 16.7 13.0 13.0
Revenue w/o fixed tax on enterpreneurs 10589.9 11623.1 12018.5 11228.5
Total Revenue 10823.8 11883.1 12500.0 11710.0 -790.0
We believe that the results of the PIT revenue
estimations are slightly too optimistic to serve as
a base for fiscal planning in the first year of the
tax reduction. To give an impression of the risks
involved with this estimate, a calculation of the
PIT with only half the above mentioned compen-
satory expansion of the declared taxable income
are presented in table 2 ('Our estimate'). The
consequent difference between the draft budget
of the Government and the IER is almost UAH
800m.
Enterprise Profit Tax
The enterprise profit tax has been reduced from
30 % to 25 % of taxable profit. The compensatory
revenues are intended to come from reduced
depreciation allowances compared to the legisla-
tion valid for 2003, basically by returning to the
old regulations governing depreciation allow-
ances. The revenue losses from the reduced tax
rate would thus be almost completely compen-
sated, but there would still be a reduction of reve-
nues in real terms compared to 2002 due to eco-
nomic growth and inflation. Some open questions
remain:
1.  The re-introduction of the old system would
eliminate the 4
th group of durable assets,
which had been created to cover equipment
with a higher replacement speed due to tech-
nical progress, predominantly computers
3
and similar devices. This step should be
carefully considered in order not to re-erect
impediments to productivity increases in ac-
tivities such as services and administration.
The new system also envisaged an increase
of all the depreciation rates by a factor of 1.6,
so the government is evidently trying to com-
pensate for the fall in the revenue due to the
lower tax rate. However, it should be advised
that the depreciation periods implied by the
deprecation rates should be consistent with
the observed life-span of investment goods.
2. In the area of enterprise profits, de-
shadowing could be more likely the result of a
lowered tax base than in the case of PIT, be-
cause enterprise profits - in contrast to sala-
ries - are generally not subject to additional
quasi-taxes. On the other hand, the scope for
businesses to hide profits are higher than for
employees. Thus, the absence of a de-
shadowing assumption is appropriate.
3.  The risk to the revenues from EPT rather
stem from the fact that elections are coming
up in 2004. This poses the risk that tax pay-
ments fall short of the expectations when
businesses get involved in fund-raising activi-
ties.
4.  The tax base of UAH 41060 m reported by
the Government would increase to UAH
45320 m through the inclusion of reduced
depreciation allowances and tax exemptions
which are planned to be abolished. However,
there are still exemptions existing, as for in-
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5 stance for agricultural production,  which are
hard to justify with respect to equitable treat-
ment of a all profits made in the National
Economy.
5.  Even when all exemptions were abolished,
the tax base is probably underestimated,
taking into account the huge tax arrears
which have been accumulated by whole eco-
nomic sectors (e.g. gas), and particularly in
state-owned enterprises. A sober tax estima-
tion should also try to make transparent the
tax efficiency, measured by the effective tax
rate (tax revenues / real tax base) divided by
the nominal tax rate. Such an approach
would remind the parliamentarians year after
year again that still a lot has to be done in the
area of taxation effectiveness and equity.
Despite all these rather general objections, we
assume that the revenue estimate of the EPT is
overall realistic, and thus make no alternative
suggestions regarding revenue shortfalls.
Value-Added Tax
The VAT revenue calculation of the Government
seems to be quite realistic on the assumption of a
maintained statutory tax base of 20%. Legeida/
Sologoub (2003) have estimated that the ratio
between the effective and the statutory VAT rate
6 is roughly 0.4 for Ukraine.  The effective VAT rate
calculated by the Government for 2004 implicitly
comes close to this estimation, making the esti-
mate of UAH 17 bn credible.
Most recently the VR has voted to reduce the
VAT from 20% to 17%. The overcoming of the
veto of the President on the draft Law that
amends VAT, may cause additional risks on the
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 See also policy paper S4 "Taxation and Ukrainian Agricultu-
re after 2004", IER, July 2002.
6
  Nina Legeida, Dimitry Sologoub: Modelling VAT Revenues
in a Transition Economy: The Case of Ukraine. Working
Paper No. 22, IER, Kyiv, July 2003
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  In the case of VAT, the discrepancy between the real tax
base (final sales according to the National Accounting) and
the effective tax base is probably very large.
revenue side of the budget. At the same time, it
was planned to offset reduced revenues by cut-
ting exemptions on VAT. In the consideration of
VAT reform, the following aspects are the most
critical:
1.  The calculations in table 2 clearly show that a
change in VAT has a great leverage on over-
all tax income. Unfortunately the comments
to the draft budget do not contain calculations
7 which are based on a tax base estimation.
Thus, we have taken final sales according to
National Accounting estimates for 2002 and
extrapolated this amount, correcting for
growth and inflation assumptions for 2003
and 2004 (see table 3).
2.  However, under the assumption that the ba-
sic VAT rate be cut to 17%, the VAT reve-
nues would plummet by almost three billion
UAH. However, the parliament has decided
to abolish certain VAT privileges to offset the
revenue losses. According to IMF estima-
tions, the value of the VAT exemptions was
UAH 5.3 bn in 2003. Of these, agriculture
makes up 1.72 bn, and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts 1.24 bn. Allegedly, exemption for phar-
maceuticals are intended to be kept, while
the situation with agricultural exemptions is
uncertain.
Due to the quite unclear situation about what
will happen with the exemptions, our calculations
assume that the VR will not manage to reduce
the exemptions by more than 50%, and that only
half of these potential revenues will be actually
collected due to the notorious problems with VAT
collection in Ukraine. This would mean that the
revenue from VAT would be reduced by UAH
1.34 bn.
Table 3: Revenues from Value-Added Tax in  2002 and 2004 (million UAH)
2002 2003 2004
actual planned Draft Budget Our estimate Our estimate Shortfall
VAT:
Gross tax base 168750.0 188774.4 211861.1 211861.1 211861.1
Nominal tax rate 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 17.0
Effective tax rate 8.1 7.2 8.1 8.0 6.8
Revenue with new effective tax rate 14406.6





The revenue from the excise taxes (ET) for the
year of 2004 is planned at the level of UAH
6.034  bn, which is 956  m or 18.8% higher than
the amount expected for 2003. The government
plans to obtain this difference through retaining
the temporary excise rate on the mixed-type pet-
rol (UAH 300 m), increasing the rates of excise
taxation of tobacco and wine products, and intro-
ducing an ad valorem rate of taxing tobacco
products sales (UAH 275 m). Hence, the share of
the excise taxes in the total tax revenue (consoli-
dated budget) is planned to increase from 9.7%
(2003) to nearly 11% in 2004. The following
comments seem to be necessary:
1.  Apparently, the excise tax could be envis-
aged as another compensatory item for the
losses to the tax revenue as incurred by the
tax reform, but it actually provides such com-
pensation mainly for the central part of the
consolidated budget, and not for the local
budgets.
2.  It is likely that the increased tax rates will lead
to decreased consumption of the consumer
goods affected, which dampens the effective
increase of revenues.
3.  It is also fair to assume that the increased tax
rates will lead to increased tax avoidance
through smuggling etc.
It is harder to determine the real tax revenues
as compared to the potential ones, but it may be
reasonable to assume that the increases in tax
revenue will be only 70 % of those actually pro-
jected, i.e. UAH 670  m. The increase in excise
tax revenue would thus be UAH 286 m lower than
estimated by the Government.
2.2. Risks concerning non-tax revenues
NBU transfers: it is unclear whether the NBU will
be able to transfer UAH 500 m as a part of its
profit to the budget 2004, because the NBU fore-
casts zero profit. The issue is discussed again
every year, with high expectations from the politi-
cal side, which frequently have to be lowered
down during the budget negotiation process. At
best, the NBU profits should be considered as a
windfall profit, but not enter the budget planning
 8 from the start.
Dividends: The Government plans to earn UAH
300 m from dividends accrued on state shares in
joint companies in 2004. That seems rather unre-
alistic looking at the execution of this revenue
item in 2001, 2002, and the preliminary results for
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9 2003.  This year, for 6 months, the Cabinet of
Ministers got only 6% from this revenue item.
Therefore, we would rather consider an amount
of UAH 100 m as realistic.
Natural gas transit fee (from ‘Naftogaz Ukrainy’):
The amount planned to be obtained on this reve-
nue item in 2004 is identical to the plan of 2002
and 2003 (UAH 2240 m). But the actual revenues
from this position have been only half of those
10 expected.  Thus, we can expect that for the
whole year the revenues may reach about UAH
1.2 bn and the fiscal gap may be about UAH 1.1
bn.
Privatisation: An amount of privatisation receipts
of UAH 2.1 bn is estimated by the Government,
which at least does not seem to be an over-
estimation.
3. Conclusions
The analysis conducted so far has shown that the
consolidated budget revenues of Ukraine for the
year is prone to some risks on the revenue side,
which are summarised in the following table 4.
The most important sources of risk are the re-
duced Personal Income Tax and the gas transit
fees. The resulting fiscal gap of UAH 2.9  bn
would add to the deficit of UAH 2.37 bn already
estimated by the Government. The overall deficit
of then roughly UAH 5.3 bn would represent
11 nearly 2 percent of GDP.  Thanks to efforts to
broaden the tax base and eliminate privileges, the
gross revenue loss was made smaller than it
would have been without such cuts. Neverthe-
less, the consolidated deficit in 2004 would be
much higher as compared to 2003 deficit (0.9 %
projected). Ukraine should be prepared to face
the need of higher internal and external borrowing
to cover the deficit than initially planned. The
implementation of the reduced VAT rate might
make things even worse by increasing the total
fiscal gap up to UAH 4.2bn, hence in this case,
the total fiscal deficit could reach UAH 6.6bn or
2.4% of GDP.
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On the allocation of NBU profits, see IER policy paper S13
"NBU-Profit: Who should get how much?", October 2002.
See also policy paper T5 "State-Owned Enterprises in
Ukraine: How the Profit Should be Distributed", July 2003.
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 See also the recent IER policy papers S17, "The Ukrainian
– Russian Gas Consortium (Kishiniv, October 2002) – A
Comment – ", October 2002; and S21 "The EU Natural Gas
Market and Ukrainian Policy on Russian Natural Gas Transit
– Will Ukraine be a Gas Bridge to Europe?", January 2003;
and S33 "Is the Ukrainian – Russian Gas Consortium in the
Interest of Ukraine?", April 2003.
11
 In the EURO area, a deficit of 3 % of GDP is considered to




Table 4: Summary of possible revenue risks for the 2004 budget (UAH million)
Government  Our estimate Difference
Personal Income Tax 12500 11710 -790
Excise taxes 6034 5748 -286
National Bank profits 500 0 -500
Dividends 300 100 -200
Gas transit fee 2243 1120 -1123
Total fiscal gap -2899
  plus planned deficit -2369
Total deficit estimated -5268
VAT 17070 15728* -1342
Total fiscal gap -4241
Total fiscal deficit -6610
* our estimate of the VAT revenues under 17% tax rate
We admit that this is a quite conservative sce-
nario, but it is supposed to indicate at the risks
which are involved with the revenue side of the
draft budget for 2004. Generally, Ukraine's grow-
ing economy should make it relatively easy for the
legislative powers to ensure fiscal stability for the
near future. The all-at-once tax cuts foreseen for
2004, however, would perhaps require a more




Table 5: Budget revenues









Dividends accrued on state shares in joint companies
Rent payment for transit of gas
Funds from energy market







































Total revenues (w/o accounting for intergovernmen-
tal transfers)


















CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 71206 75556
* - Plan takes into account the amendments made to the Law till this moment